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Expanding the Investment Company Act: The
SEC's Manipulation of the Definition of Security
C. STEVEN BRADFORD*
The definition of "security" in the Investment Company Act is virtually
identical to the definition in the Securities Act of 1933. Nevertheless, the
Securities and Exchange Commission takes the position that "security" is
defined more broadly in the Investment Company Act than in the otherfederal
securities laws, and, in particular,that certificates of deposit and commercial
notes are securitiesfor purposes of the Investment Company Act. The practical
effect of this position is to turn into investment companies many investment
programsthat otherwise would not be covered by the Act.
ProfessorBradfordpoints out that the SEC's currentposition is inconsistent
with the SEC's own pre-1982position that "'security"had the same meaning in
all the federal securities statutes. The SEC's position changed as the Supreme
Court limited the definition of security in the Securities Act of 1933 and the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The SECS non-equivalenceposition is also
inconsistent with both the legislative history of the Investment Company Act,
including statementsfrom the SECS own counsel, and the limited case law.
Finally, ProfessorBradfordshows that the SEC's policy argumentfor a more
expansive interpretationof "security" in the Investment Company Act is flawed.
I. INTRODUCTION

The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is sometimes accused of
using the administrative process "to graft new, substantive standards and
obligations onto existing statutes or SEC rules."1 Through the use of the no-action
letter process,2 the SEC staff sometimes creates substantive securities law which
is inconsistent with the relevant federal securities statutes and case law.3 Many of
* Cline, Williams, Wright, Johnson & Oldfather Professor of Law, University of
Nebraska College of Law. My thanks to Joseph A. Franco and Larry D. Barnett for their helpful
comments on an earlier draft and to Jessica Feller, University of Nebraska College of Law
Class of 1998, for her research assistance.
I Donna M. Nagy, Judicial Reliance on Regulatory Interpretationsin SEC No-Action
Letters: CurrentProblemsandaProposedFramework,83 CORNELLL. REV. 921,961 (1998).
2The no-action procedure allows securities lawyers and others to solicit the SEC staff's
views on whether proposed transactions would violate the federal securities laws. The typical
no-action request describes the transaction proposed and expresses counsel's view that the
transaction will not violate the particular statutory provisions or rules with respect to which noaction relief is requested. If the SEC staff concurs, its response indicates that, if the transaction
proceeds as outlined (or as modified to meet the staff's concerns), the staff will not recommend
that the SEC take any enforcement action. See generally Thomas P. Lemke, The SEC NoAction LetterProcess,42 Bus. LAW. 1019 (1987).
3See Lewis D. Lowenfels, SECNo-Action Letters: Conflicts with ExistingStatutes, Cases,
and Commission Releases, 59 VA. L. REV. 303, 304, 319 (1973) [hereinafter Conflicts]; Lewis

OHIOSTATE LA WJOURATAL

[Vol. 60:3

these staff positions "go far beyond reasonable and fair explanations of existing
statutes or SEC rules." 4 However, in substantive areas lacking definitive case law
or rules, these no-action letters assume an extraordinary importance to securities
lawyers and regulated entities.5 For all practical purposes, the SEC position
becomes the law, whether or not the position is faithful to the statute.
The SEC's interpretation of the term "security" in the Investment Company
Act of 19406 (Investment Company Act or Act) is a particularly egregious
example of law-making by SEC administrative fiat The SEC's authority under
the Investment Company Act like its authority under the other federal securities
statutes, turns on the presence of "securities." The Act regulates "investment
companies," and, to be an investment company, an investment fund or program
usually must both issue securities to its investors and invest in securities itself.7
It is not surprising that a number ofno-action requests have raised this issue.8
Investment companies are heavily regulated and the sponsors of investment funds
naturally want to avoid the cost of such regulation. The SEC and its staff,
mimicking similar attempts under other federal securities statutes, 9 have
attempted to expand their jurisdiction by broadening the definition of "security"
in a way that goes beyond the bounds of fair statutory interpretation.
Originally, the SEC took the position that the definition of "security" in the
Investment Company Act was coextensive with the virtually identical definitions
in the Securities Act of 193310 (Securities Act) and the Securities Exchange Act
of 193411 (Exchange Act). As the Supreme Court narrowed its reading of the
Securities Act and Exchange Act definitions, the SEC reversed course. In 1982,
the SEC "discovered" that the Investment Company Act definition of "security,"
despite the similar language, is broader than the definitions in the earlier federal
securities statutes.12 This non-equivalence position turns into regulated
"investment companies" many investment programs that would not be subject to
D. Lowenfels, SEC No-Action Letters: Some Problemsand SuggestedApproaches, 71 COLUM.

L. REV. 1256, 1266 (1971) [hereinafter Problems];Nagy, supranote 1, at 960-62.
4Nagy, supranote 1, at 961.
5See Lemke, supranote 2, at 1019; Nagy, supra note 1, at 947; Problems,supranote 3, at
1257.
6 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to 80a-64 (1994 & Supp. 1111997).
7See infra text accompanying notes 14-17.
8See, e.g., infranotes 37, 40, 55, 57.
9 See ROBERTA S. KARMEL, REGULATION BY PROSECuTION: THE SECURITIEs AND

EXCHANGE COMMISSION VS. CORPORATE AMERICA 189-90 (1982) (offering the SEC's attempt
to expand the scope of the term "security" as an example of an instance "when the securities

laws were applied to a set of facts in a manner that stretches the provisions of the statutes
beyond generally accepted bounds").
10 15 U.S.C. §§ 77ato 77aa (1994).
11 15 U.S.C. §§ 78ato 78kk (1994 & Supp. I 1997).
12
See infra Part I.B.
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the Investment Company Act if the Securities Act and Exchange Act definitions
were followed.
In this Article, I examine the SEC's expansive interpretation of the meaning
of "security" under the Investment Company Act, and the legislative, judicial, and
policy underpinnings of that interpretation. Part II begins with a review of the
relevant statutory language and the SEC's position. Part III concludes that the
SEC's position is inconsistent with the legislative history of the Act, including the
testimony of its own counsel. It is reasonably clear that Congress (and the SEC) in
1940 intended the term "security" in the Investment Company Act to be defined
the same as in the Securities Act and the Exchange Act. Since the SEC's change
of position, Congress has amended the Investment Company Act in a way that
bolsters the SEC's position with respect to one particular type of instrumentcertificates of deposit. But, even broadly construed, the amendment does not
otherwise support the SEC's position that "security" is different under the
Investment Company Act. Part IV shows that the SEC's position is also
inconsistent with the limited case law construing the Act's definition of
"security." Almost no judicial authority supports the SEC's position; the case law
treats the various definitions of security as equivalent. Part V reviews the limited
policy arguments made by the SEC and its staff to justify its broader
interpretation of "security" under the Investment Company Act. These policy
arguments provide the strongest support for the SEC's arguments, but I conclude
they are unconvincing. Moreover, a policy argument alone cannot justify the
SEC's attempt to override the language of the Act, the clear legislative history,
and the limited case law.
Much of the development discussed in this Article has come through the
responses of the SEC staff to no-action requests, which do not represent the
official position of the SEC. However, there is significant evidence that both the
13
Commission and its staff expect no-action letters to have a policymaking effect.
Moreover, the position discussed in this Article does not arise from a single,
isolated no-action response. It is difficult to believe that such a consistent position
was taken without the Commissioners' knowledge and approval. In any event,
some of the actions detailed in this Article are Commission-approved actions.
Therefore, it is not unfair to charge the SEC with responsibility for exceeding its
statutory authority.

13 See Nagy, supranote 1, at 950.
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H-.THE SEC's CHANGING INTERPRETATION OF THE DEFINITION OF

"SEcuRrrY" N THE INVESTMENT COMPANY Acr
A. The Statutory Definitions
The definition of "security" is crucial to determining the scope of the
Investment Company Act. The Act regulates "investment companies" and the
term "security" factors into the definition of "investment company" in two ways.
First, an investment company must be an "issuer," 14 which the Act defines as
"every person who issues or proposes to issue any security, or has outstanding
any security which it has issued."15 Second, except for companies in the business
of issuing face-amount installment certificates,1 6 the issuer must engage or
propose to engage "in the business of investing, reinvesting, owning, holding, or
trading in securities....
Thus, an investment company must both issue and
own "securities," as defined by the Act. If the instruments a company sells to its
investors are not securities or the instruments it purchases are not securities, the
company is not an investment company and is not subject to the Act Of course,
not all companies that fall within these basic definitions are covered by the Act
The Investment Company Act contains many exceptions to these basic
definitions, 18 and it also exempts some investment companies from the statutory
requirements. 19
Section 2(a)(36) of the Investment Company Act defines a "security" as:
"17

[A]ny note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness,
certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement, collateraltrust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable share,
14

"When used in this subehapter, 'investment company' means any issuer .... "
15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(a)(1) (1994 & Supp. IH 1997) (emphasis added).
15 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(22) (1994) (emphasis added).
16
See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(a)(1)(B) (Supp. 11 1997). For a definition of "face-amount
certificate," see 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(15) (1994). This part of the definition of "investment
company" has little contemporary significance. See I THOMAS P. LEMKE, Er AL., REGULATION
OF INVEgTMENT COMPANiES § 4.02 (1999).
17 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(a)(1)(C) (Supp. M 1997) (emphasis added). If the issuer is "in the
business of investing, reinvesting or trading in securities," no additional requirements need be
met for the issuer to be an investment company. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(a)(1)(A) (Supp. 11 1997).
Subsection (C) adds "owning" and "holding" securities to the definition, with an additional
requirement that "investment securities" must exceed 40% of the value of the issuer's total
assets, exclusive of government securities and cash items. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(a)(1)(C)
(Supp. 1I 1997). The term "investment securities" includes most securities, with some
exceptions. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(a)(2) (Supp. 1H 1997).
18 See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(b),(c) (1994 & Supp. 1111997).
19 See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-6 (1994).
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investment contract voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit for a security,
fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, any put, call,
straddle, option, or privilege on any security (including a certificate of deposit) or
on any group or index of securities (including any interest therein or based on the
value thereof), or any put call, straddle, option, or privilege entered into on a
national securities exchange relating to foreign currency, or, in general, any
interest or instrument commonly known as a "security," or any certificate of
interest or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for,
guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscne to or purchase, any of the
foregoing. 20
The definitions of "security" in the Securities Act, 2 1 the Exchange Act,2 2 and
the Investment Advisers Act23 are essentially the same.2 4 The four definitions
differ in some respects, but most of the differences are in the Exchange Act
definition and most of those are minor.2 5 In spite of these differences, the courts
20 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(36) (1994). The definitions section of the Investment Company
Act, like the definitions sections of the other federal securities statutes, contains a context clause
at the beginning: "unless the context otherwise requires.'
15 U.S.C. § 80a-2
(1994 & Supp. m 1997).
21 See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (Supp. 1'I 1997) (definitions section ofthe Securities Act).
22 See 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1994) (definitions section of the Exchange Act).
23
See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(18) (1994) (definitions section of the Investment Advisers
Act).24
See also 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(36) (1994) (definitions section of the Investment
Company Act); 3 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION
171 (3d ed. 1995) ("The Investment Company Act ... contains basically the same definition of
securities as that in the Securities Act of 1933 and the 1934 Exchange Act.").
25 The key substantive difference is language at the end of the Exchange Act definition
excluding certain short-term indebtedness. Section 3(a)(10) of the Exchange Act provides that
the term security "shall not include currency or any note, draft, bill of exchange, or banker's
acceptance which has a maturity at the time of issuance of not exceeding nine months,
exclusive of days of grace, or any renewal thereof the maturity of which is likewise limited."
15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1994). This does not appear in any of the other definitions, although the
Securities Act contains an exemption with similar language. See 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(3) (1994).
Most of the other differences are minor. The Exchange Act definition does not include the
term "evidence of indebtedness" that appears in the other three definitions. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a2(a)(36) (1994). The other three definitions include "any interest or instrument commonly
known as a 'security'... ." See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (Supp. I1 1997); 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10)
(1994); 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(36). The Exchange Act definition just says "any instrument
commonly known as a 'security'[,]" and leaves out the word "interest." 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10)
(1994). The other three definitions include "fractional undivided interest[s] in oil, gas, or other
mineral rights." See. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1); 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10); 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(36).
The Exchange Act definition does not contain this phrase, but adds "certificate of interest or
participation ... in any oil, gas, or other mineral royalty or lease." 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10). The
other three definitions conclude with the following catch-all phrase: "any certificate of interest
or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or
right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing." See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1); 15 U.S.C.
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have concluded that the Exchange Act definition is to be interpreted as identical
to the Securities Act definition. 26 The only relevant difference between the
Securities Act and Exchange Act definitions, on the one hand, and the definitions
in the Investment Company and Investment Advisers Acts, on the other hand,
arose from amendments to all of these statutes in 1982. Those amendments are
discussed later in this article.27
B. The SEC's ChangingPosition-FromEquivalence to Non-equivalence
Given the similarity of the statutory definitions, it is not surprising that the
SEC and its staff initially took the position that the definition of "security" in the
Investment Company Act was coextensive with the definitions in the other federal
securities laws. 2 8 At the time, the courts were expansively construing the federal
securities laws, particularly the definition of security. Later, however, the federal
courts, particularly the United States Supreme Court, began to read the term
"security" in the Securities and Exchange Acts more restrictively,2 9 and the SEC
abandoned its then-troublesome equivalence position. The SEC now contends
that the definition of "security" in the Investment Company Act is broader than
§ 78c(a)(10); 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(36). The Exchange Act definition includes this clause except
for the "guarantee of' language. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(36).
26
See Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 61 n.1 (1990); Landreth Timber Co. v.
Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 686 n.1 (1985); United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837,
847 n.12 (1975); Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332,335 (1967); see also Lewis D. Lowenfels
& Alan R. Bromberg, What is a Security Under the FederalSecurities Laws?, 56 ALBANY L.
REv. 473,478 (1993).
27 The Securities Act and the Exchange Act include in their respective definitions of
security "any put, call, straddle, option or privilege on any security, certificate of deposit, or
group or index ofsecurities(including any interest therein or based on the value thereof) . . . 2'
15 U.S.C. §§ 77b(a)(1), 78c(a)(10) (1994 & Supp. mI 1997) (emphasis added). The Investment
Company Act and the Investment Advisers Act reword this as follows: "[A]ny put, call,
straddle, option, or privilege on any security (including a certificateofdeposit) or on any group
or index of securities (including any interest therein or based on the value thereof).. .. "
15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-2(a)(36) (1994), 80b-2(a)(18) (1994) (emphasis added). This difference is
discussed infra in Part II.B.
28 See American Express Income Shares, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, [1974-1975
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 80,074, at 85,021 (Sept. 13, 1974); see also Brief
for the Petitioner SEC at 50, SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 65 (1959)
(arguing first that the contracts sold were "securities" under the Securities Act, then, in arguing
that the issuer was an investment company, simply cross-referencing the Securities Act
discussion as having "shown that the contracts sold by appellees are securities").
29 The Supreme Court opinions defining "security" have gone through three phases. From
1943 to 1967, the Court focused on the securities laws' broad remedial purpose, and read the
definitions broadly. From 1975 to 1982, the Court created judicial exceptions for instruments
even though they were named in the definitional paragraph. Since 1985, the Court has retreated
some from its aggressive creation of exceptions. See Park McGinty, What Is a Security?, 1993
WIs. L. REv. 1033, 1040-42.
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the definitions in the Securities Act and the Exchange Act.
30
The SEC's change of position came in 1982. In Marine Bank v. Weaver,
the Supreme Court considered whether a federally insured certificate of deposit
was a security for purposes of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act.31 Prior to this
case, the SEC had filed several amicus briefs arguing that federally insured
certificates of deposit were securities under the federal securities laws.3 2 In
Marine Bank, however, the United States filed an amicus brief conceding that the
certificate of deposit was not a security.33 However, the brief argued that the
Investment Company Act "presents a significantly different context' 34 and that
certificates of deposit should be securities under that Act.3 5 According to the
amicus brief, the exclusion of certificates of deposit from the Investment
Company Act definition "would seriously undermine the protections
contemplated by Congress .... -"36 The government asked the Court to limit its
holding to the particular facts of the case, and not to resolve whether the federal
37
securities laws would apply in other contexts.
The Supreme Court's response in Marine Bank was ambiguous. The Court
did not directly address the government's argument for a different interpretation
of the term "security" under the Investment Company Act. However, a footnote at
the end of the opinion noted that certificates of deposit do not invariably fall
outside the definition of "security" in the federal statutes.3 8 According to the
Court, "[e]ach transaction must be analyzed and evaluated on the basis of the
content of the instruments in question, the purposes intended to be served, and the
factual setting as a whole." 39
Prior to MarineBank, the SEC staff had refused to grant no-action relief to
companies that were pooling investor funds to purchase federally insured bank

30 455 U.S. 551 (1982).
31 The term "certificate of deposit, for a security" found in the various definitions of
"security" does not refer to ordinary bank certificates of deposit See id. at 557 n.5; Arnold S.
Jacobs, The Meaning of "Security" Under Rule 10b-5, 29 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REv. 211, 326
(1984). The instruments that most commonly fall within this part of the definition are American
Depositary Receipts for foreign securities and instruments issued by protective committees in
the course of corporate reorganizations. See id. at 325-26.
32
See Werner Kronstein, SEC Practice: The CD Muddle, 9 SEC. REG. L.. 395, 395
(1982).

33

See Brief for the United States as Anicus Curiae at 6-7, Marine Bank v. Weaver,
455 U.S. 551 (1982) (No. 80-1562).
34

Id. at22.

35

See id.at 23-24.
Id. The policy basis for this argument is discussed infra in Part V.
37
See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supranote 33, at 24.
38
See Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551,560 n.11 (1982).
36

39 Id.
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certificates of deposit.40 According to the staff, the participations in the
certificates of deposit offered by these programs were securities, making the
programs issuers.4 1 Furthermore, the certificates of deposit were themselves
securities and therefore the issuers were investment companies 42 The SEC staff
had similarly rejected no-action requests from companies pooling investments in
commercial paper, even though commercial paper clearly was excluded from the
Securities Act and the Exchange Act. The staff concluded that the commercial
instruments these funds were purchasing could be securities and, therefore, the
funds were, or could be, investment companies 4 3
Shortly after Marine Bank was decided, each of these positions was
challenged. First, Merrill Lynch filed a no-action request challenging the staff s
view that certificates of deposit were securities under the Investment Company
Act. 4 Merrill Lynch planned to purchase portfolios of large-denomination, shortterm, federally insured certificates of deposit and sell investors fractional,
undivided interests in those portfolios. Merrill Lynch argued that the portfolios
would not be investment companies because, after Marine Bank, the certificates
40

See North Carolina State Employees' Ass'n, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, [1980
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 76,344 at 76,456 (Mar. 13, 1980); Bank of Oregon,
SEC No-Action Letter, [1980 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCII) 76,320 at 76,397
(Dec. 20, 1979); American Deposit Trust Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, [1976-1977 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCM) 80,805 at 87,101 (Oct. 8, 1976); Underwood, Neuhaus &
Co., SEC No-Action Letter, [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCI) 80,156 at
85,272 (Feb. 13, 1975); Arthur E. Fox, SEC No-Action Letter, [1974-1975 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 80,082 at 85,037 (Dec. 12, 1974); Josephthal & Co., SEC No-Action
Letter, [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCM) 80,116 at 85,126 (Nov. 25,
1974); Warren W. York & Co., SEC No-Action Letter, [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 79,758 at 84,040 (Apr. 4, 1974); Maynard Merel, SEC No-Action Letter,
[1973-1974 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCI-) 79,652 at 83,762 (Jan. 9,1974).
41 See, e.g., Arthur E. Fox, supra note 40, at 85,037; Josephthal & Co., supra note 40, at
85,126.
42
See North Carolina State Employees' Ass'n, Inc., supra note 40, at 76,456. Of course,
at the time, the SEC's position was that certificates of deposit were securities under all of the
federal securities statutes. See supra note 32.
43 See Omni Management Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, [1979-1980 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 82,416 at 82,742 (May 10, 1979); World Evangelical Dev., Ltd.,
SEC No-Action Letter, [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCI) 82,057 at 81,697
(Apr. 5, 1979); National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, [1974-1975
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 80,130 at 85,156 (Feb. 23, 1975). Commonwealth
Fund, SEC No-Action Letter, available in 1971 WL 11098 at *2 (July 15, 1971). But see
Prudential-American Sec., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 80,106 at 85,102 (Jan. 26, 1975) (allowing no-action relief where company
was buying bankers' acceptances from banks for the accounts of several clients).
44 See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, [1982-1983
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 77,310 at 78,146 (Oct. 28, 1982) [hereinafter
Merrill Lynch].
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45

of deposit were not securities
The SEC staff's unusually detailed response rejected Merrill Lynch's
position. The staff first argued that certificates of deposit, like notes, debentures,
and evidences of indebtedness, fall -within the statutory definition unless the
context otherwise requires.4 6 According to the staff, footnote 11 in Marine Bank
"seems to recognize the validity of the SEC's concern that the term 'security' not
be construed in a way that would call into question the applicability of the
securities laws in other contexts."47 The context of Merrill Lynch's proposal
"does not require the certificates of deposit to be deemed outside the definition of
'security' for purposes of the... [Investment Company Act]."'4 8 To the contrary,
the context requires that the certificates of deposit be considered securities: they
are negotiable and liquid, presenting the opportunities for misappropriation that
Congress sought to prevent when it passed the Investment Company Act 49 The
banking regulation and deposit insurance that the Supreme Court relied on in
Marine Bank would not protect investors in this context, 50 so the certificates of
deposit must be treated as securities.
A year later, another no-action response made it clear that this nonequivalence position extended not just to certificates of deposit, but to other
instruments as well. Bank of America Canada, a wholly-owned Canadian
subsidiary of Bank of America National Savings Association, submitted a no51
action request arguing that it should not be treated as an investment company.
The Canadian subsidiary's assets included notes evidencing loans it had made; if
these notes were securities, the Canadian subsidiary could be an investment
company, because the SEC had determined that foreign banks were not entitled to
the exception from the definition of investment company available to domestic
banks. 52 The bank pointed out that the courts, for purposes of the Securities Act
45

See id at 78,146-48. Merrill Lynch also argued that the participation interests sold to
investors were not securities; therefore, the portfolios were not issuers. See id.at 78,147.
46 See id.at 78,150.
47Id.
48

49

Id.

See id For further discussion of this policy argument, see infra Part V.
50 See Merrill Lynch, supra note 44, at 78,151.
51 See Bank of America Canada, SEC No-Action Letter (July 25, 1983) available in
1983 WL 29858, at *4. This letter is sometimes cited by the name of the parent company, Bank
of America National Savings Association.
52
See id.; see also Michael Gruson & Phillip L. Jackson, Issuance of Securities by
Foreign Banks and the Investment Company Act of 1940, 1980 U. ILL. L.F. 185, 195-201
(1980). In 1991, the SEC adopted Rule 3a-6, which excepts foreign banks and foreign
insurance companies from the definition of "investment company." See 17 C.F.R. § 2703a-6
(1998); Exception from the Definition of Investment Company for Foreign Banks and Foreign
Insurance Companies, Investment Company Act Release No. 18381, [1991 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,846, at 82,200 (Oct. 29, 1991).
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and the Exchange Act, had "uniformly rejected" the view that notes such as these
were securities: "The case law is now completely settled that an evidence of
indebtedness created in connection with a borrowing from a financial institution
in the ordinary course of such institution's business is not a security, at least while
in the hands of the lending institution. ' '5 3 The bank argued that the result should
be the same under the Investment Company Act, and asked the staff to reconsider
54
its earlier position to the contrary.
The SEC staff refused. The staff pointed out that none of the cases cited by
the bank, including Marine Bank, arose under the Investment Company Act.5 5
The staff argued that footnote 11 in Marine Bank was consistent with the SEC's
position that the Investment Company Act context was different, and therefore
none of the cases cited by the bank applied.5 6 The staff also rejected the
commercial/investment dichotomy that had been used in the Securities Act and
Exchange Act cases to decide if notes were securities. The staff indicated that
even purely commercial notes were securities for purposes of the Investment
57
Company Act.
The SEC staff's responses to subsequent no-action requests have generally
been consistent with the MerrillLynch response: for purposes of the Investment
Company Act, certificates of deposit are securities.5 8 With little analysis, the staff
has rebuffed attempts to apply Marine Bank to the Investment Company Act.5 9
Consistent with the Bank ofAmerica Canadaposition, the staff has also refused

53 Bank of America Canada, supranote 51, at *1.

54 The bank conceded that, if investment money was pooled to be invested in commercial
loans, it might be treated differently under the SEC's argument in the MarineBank brief.See iad
55

56

See id.at *4.

See id.
57 See itat *5.The staff noted that, in two places where the Investment Company Act
referred to an issuer's "outstanding securities," a parenthetical excluded "short term paper."
See id.;
15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(b)(3), (c)(1) (1994). "Short-term paper" is defined to include
commercial notes. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(38) (1994).
58
See Pacific Heritage Assurance Co., SEC No-Action Letter (Sept. 26, 1985) available
in 1985 WL 54352, at *6; International Venture Fin. Ltd., SEC No-Action Letter, [1983-1984
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 77,527 at 78,697 (July 1, 1983); NEA-New
Hampshire Payroll Inv. Plan, SEC No-Action Letter, [1982-1983 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 77,429 at 78,572 (Apr. 29, 1983).
59
See Pacific Heritage Assurance Co., supra note 58, at *6; International Venture Fin.
Ltd., supra note 58, at 78,697; NEA-New Hampshire Payroll Iv.Plan, supra note 58, at
78,572. Possible exceptions are the staff's no-action positions in College Assurance Plan, SEC
No-Action Letter, [1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 79,492 at 77,510
(Sept. 8, 1989) and E.F. Hutton & Co., [1984-1985 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
77,909 at 79,442 (Mar. 28, 1985). However, those responses are better distinguished on the
basis that, even if the underlying certificates of deposit were securities, the plans were not
"issuers" because they were not offering separate securities to investors.
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to grant no-action relief to issuers investing in notes. 60
The SEC has revisited its non-equivalence position in one additional context
since Marine Bank. In 1992, the SEC's Division of Investment Management
prepared a report, ProtectingInvestors: A Half Century ofInvestment Company
Regulation (ProtectingInvestors report), discussing several investment company
issues.61 One of the issues the report addressed was how to deal with structured
financings, backed by instruments such as mortgage notes and consumer
receivables. The Protecting Investors report recommended a rule exempting
structured financings from the Investment Company Act registration
requirements. 62 The Division rejected an alternative suggestion-to interpret the
definition of "security" in the Investment Company Act, like the definitions in the
63
Securities Act and the Exchange Act, to exclude "commercial" instruments.
The Division pointed out that many registered investment companies invest in
such securities, and argued that those companies should continue to be subject to
the Investment Company Act.64 Thus, since the Marine Bank brief, the SEC and
its staff have not wavered from the non-equivalence position.
Hi. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
The language of the Investment Company Act does not support the SEC's
non-equivalence position, since that language is almost identical to the language
in the Securities Act and in the Exchange Act. But, even though the language is
60

See Harrell Int'l, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (May 24, 1989) available in 1989 WL
246259, at *5; Education Loan Mktg. Ass'n, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, [1985-1986 Transfer
Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 78,215 at 76,851 (Mar. 6, 1986); Gins Capital Corp., SEC
No-Action Letter, [1985-1986 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 78,151 at 76,665
(Sept. 9, 1985). But see Harvest Real Estate Variable Annuity Account, SEC No-Action Letter
(Feb. 23, 1983) availablein 1983 WL 31030, at *5 (offering annuity contracts and investing in
commercial mortgage loans and real estate sale-leaseback investments).
61

See generally DIvIsION OF INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT, SEC, PROTECrING INVESTORS:

A HALF CENT RY OF INVESTMENT COMPANY REGULATION (1992).

62 See id at 77. Such a rule was eventually adopted. See Exclusions from the Definition of
Investment Company for Structured Financings, Investment Company Act Release No. 19105,
[1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 85,062, at 83,499 (Nov. 19, 1992).
63

See DIVISION OF INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT, SEC, supranote 61, at 96.

64

See id at 97. According to the report:

[W]hile excluding commercial instruments from the disclosure requirements of the
Securities Act and the Exchange Act is consistent with the purposes of those Acts,
issuers that pool these instruments nevertheless may be functionally equivalent to,
and present the same investor protection concerns as, investment companies that
invest in securities that are registered under those Acts.

Id. at 97 n.339 (citing the government's MarineBankaictus brief).
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the same, the SEC's non-equivalence position might still be justified if the
legislative history of the Investment Company Act supports it. Legislative history
is important in determining the scope of the federal securities laws; it plays an
65
important and sometimes decisive role in Supreme Court securities decisions.
Unfortunately for the SEC, the legislative history of the Investment Company
Act is inconsistent with the current SEC position. The legislative history instead
supports the view that the term "security" in the Investment Company Act was
meant to be identical to the same term in the earlier federal securities statutes. To
support its contrary view, the SEC has ignored the most directly relevant
legislative material and has focused instead on general policy language in the
legislative record. The resulting position is contrary to the SEC's own intent when
it drafted the statute in 1940. The history of the 1982 amendments to the Act
bolsters the SEC's position, at least as to certificates of deposit, but even here, the
legislative history is surprisingly clouded.
A. The 1940 Legislative History
The legislative history of the Investment Company Act really begins in 1935.
In that year, Congress enacted the Public Utility Holding Company Act; Section
30 directed the SEC to study investment trusts.6 6 The study, commonly called the
Investment Trust Study, was submitted to Congress in several parts beginning in
1938, and was accompanied by six supplemental reports.67 On March 14, 1940, a
bill drafted by the SEC was introduced simultaneously in the Senate as S. 3580
and in the House of Representatives as H.R. 8935.68 The Securities
Subcommittee of the Senate Banking and Currency Committee held extensive
hearings on S. 3580 in April 1940.69 Those hearings revealed that the SEC and
the investment company industry were "strongly divided" over the contents of the
bill, 70 but after five weeks of negotiation, a compromise bill emerged. 71 That
compromise bill was introduced in the Senate as S. 4108 and in the House as H.R.
10065.72 A subcommittee of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign
6 5 See Randall

W. Quinn, The Supreme Court's Use ofLegislativeHistory in Interpreting
the FederalSecuritiesLaws, 22 SEc. REG. L.J. 262,268-75 (1994).
66
See 15 U.S.C. § 79z-4 (1994).
67

See Walter P. North, A Brief History of Federal Investment Company Legislation,

44 NOTREDAMELAW. 677,678 (1969); see also 1 LEMKEErAL.,supranote 16, § 2.03.
68
See North, supranote 67, at 679; 1LEMKE Er AL., supranote 16, § 2.04.
69

See generally Hearings on S. 3580 Before A Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on
Bankingand Currency,76th Cong. (1940) [hereinafter Senate Hearings].
70 See 1 LEMKE Er AL., supra note 16, § 2.04. See generallySenate Hearings,supra note

69.
71 See JOEL SELGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET: A HISTORY OF THE
SECURrTIEs AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND MODERN CORPORAT FINANCE 228 (1995).
72
See 1 LEMKEET AL., supranote 16, § 2.04.

1999]

DEFINITIONOFSECURITY

1007

Commerce held hearings on H.R. 10065 on June 13 and 14, 1940.73 House
Report 10065 was subsequently reported with numerous amendments, mostly of
a technical and clerical nature, 4 and, after amendment, the final Investment
7
Company Act was signed by the President on August 22, 1940.5
Neither the original SEC bill nor the compromise bill support the SEC's nonequivalence position. In S. 3580, the original bill drafted by the SEC, the
proposed Investment Company Act simply made a cross-reference to the
definition of "security" in the Securities Act: 'Security', 'prospectus', and
'underwriter' have the same meanings as in the Securities Act of 1933."76 At the
Senate hearings on S. 3580, David Schencker, Chief Counsel for the SEC's
Investment Trust Study, discussed the proposed bill section by section, but he did
not elaborate on the definitions section.7 7 Arthur Bunker, an industry
representative who outlined a proposed rewrite of the bill at the end of the Senate
hearings, was the only other witness to mention the Section 45 definitions. He
merely noted that "[m]any of these definitions need revision, but this is a matter
'78
for detailed drafting.
It is clear that S.3580, with its simple cross-reference to the Securities Act,
does not support the SEC's non-equivalence position. It provided quite plainly
that the term "security" would have the "same meaning" as in the Securities Act
If the SEC's current interpretation has any support in the legislative history, that
support must come from the compromise bill, H.R. 10065.
The compromise bill eliminated S. 3580's direct cross-reference to the
Securities Act, and instead included its own stand-alone definition of "security."
Section 2(a)(35) of the Investment Company Act, as it appeared in H.R. 10065,
defined security as:
[A]ny note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness,
certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement, collateraltrust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable share,
investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit for a security,
fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, or, in general, any
73 See

generally Hearings on H.R. 10065 Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on
InterstateandForeign Commerce, 76th Cong., (1940) [hereinafter House Hearings].
74 See North, supranote 67, at 680 n.1 1.

75

See 1LEMK Er AL., supranote 16, § 2.04.
Senate Hearings,supra note 69, at 26 (quoting S. 3580, tit. I, § 45(a)(3)) (emphasis
added). The proposed Investment Advisers Act, in turn, incorporated the Investment Company
Act definition. See idat 30 (quoting S. 3580, tit.II, § 203 and incorporating, inter alia, Section
45 of the Investment Company Act).
7 7 See Senate Hearings,supra note 69, at 318. However, an outline Schencker prepared
for a January 1940 meeting vith industry representatives reflected S. 3580's eventual language:
'For the purpose of defining securities, underwriters, etc., the definitions will in general be the
same as described in the 1933 act, the 1934 act, and the 1935 act." Id.at 400.
78
Id.at 1058.
76
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interest or instrument commonly known as a "security", or any certificate of
interest or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for,
guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the
foregoing. 7 9
It is clear that the addition of a full definition of "security" to the Act had
nothing to do with the SEC's current position that "security" in the Investment
Company Act does not have the "same meaning" as in the other federal securities
statutes. The definition in H.R. 10065 is identical in every respect to the definition
that appeared in the 1940 version of the Securities Act.80 Instead of incorporating
the Securities Act definition by reference, as the SEC's original bill did, the
compromise bill simply repeated the Securities Act definition verbatim. This
change was not intended to change the original proposal's intent that "security"
have the "same meaning" as in the Securities Act. David Schencker of the SEC,
testifying about the definitions section of the compromise bill said:
I may say this, generally, that many ofthe definitions were incorporated from the
1933 act and the 1934 act and that was done at the suggestion of the industry.
They felt that they would like to have the entire bill in one volume instead of
81
having to refer to one act and then to another, you see.
In other words, the language of the definition was changed, not for substantive
reasons, but simply so people using the statute would not have to go back and
forth between the Investment Company Act and the Securities Act.
Given the compromises necessary to pass any investment company
legislation, an argument that the compromise bill strengthened the definition of
"security" is preposterous. It was clear that the legislation originally drafted by the
SEC would not pass. 82 The eventual Investment Company Act was a "watereddown bill" 83 that one commentator has termed "[t]he SEC's greatest legislative
79

House Hearings, supra note 73, at 6 (quoting H.R. 10065, tit. I, § 2(a)(35)).
The definition in the proposed Investment Advisers Act was identical, except that it used the
spelling "guaranty" instead of "guarantee." Id. at 45 (quoting H.R. 10065, tit. lII, § 202(a)(18)).
80
See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(l) (1940).
81 House Hearings,supranote 73, at 101. One of the industry representatives who helped
negotiate and draft the compromise bill expressed a similar view. In 1941, noting that little in
the definitions section calls for special comment, he stated: "Many of the definitions follow
closely, if not verbatim, similar definitions in the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934." Alfred Jaretzki, Jr., The Investment CompanyAct of 1940, 26 WASH.
U. L.Q. 303, 314 (1941). The definition of "security" was not one of the few definitions he
flagged as calling for special attention. See id If, as the SEC contends, the Investment
Company Act definition was intended to be broader, one would expect one of the drafters, in a
contemporaneous article, to point that out.
82
See 1 LEMKE ErAL., supranote 16, § 2.04.
83 SELIGMAN, supranote 71, at 229.
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defeat during the Roosevelt administration." 84 The Act "must be read in the
85
light.., of the fact that... [it] constituted in a sense compromise legislation."
The idea that this compromise contained a stronger definition of the term
"security" than the original bill is incredible, especially given the SEC's own
counsel's admission that the language was suggested by industry
86
representatives.
The SEC's use of the Act's legislative history ignores the direct evidence that
Congress (and the SEC) meant "security" to have the same meaning in the
Investment Company Act as in the other federal securities statutes. Instead, the
SEC staff focuses on broad, general statements in the legislative record about the
problems associated with investment companies, and argues that a broader
reading of "security" is necessary to further the Congressional policies underlying
the Act. The SEC focuses on the liquid, negotiable nature of certificates of deposit
and commercial paper and argues that those characteristics justify regulation
under the Investment Company Act. Part V deals with the merits of this policy
argument. The discussion here focuses on the support for this argument in the
legislative history.
The liquid, negotiable nature of investment company assets is noted at several
places in the legislative record. For example, SEC Commissioner Robert E. Healy
testified before the House committee that:
[Tihe problems [associated with investment companies] enter largely from the
nature of assets. The assets usually.., are cash and securities which are very
liquid and readily negotiable. Because of these characteristics the control of these
funds offers manifold opportunities for exploitation by unscrupulous
87
managements wherever they have existed.
Statements echoing Commissioner Healy's comments appear in the House and
Senate Reports. The Senate Report, for example, states:
Basically, the problems flow from the very nature of the assets of
investment companies. The assets of such companies invariably consist of cash
and securities, assets which are completely liquid, mobile and readily negotiable.
Because of these characteristics, control of such funds offers manifold
opportunities for exploitation by the unscrupulous managements of some
companies. These assets can and have been easily misappropriated and diverted

84

ld at 222.

85 Jaretzki, supranote 81, at 303.
86

See supratext accompanying note 81.
at 58.

87 House Hearings,supranote 73,
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by such types of managements, and have been employed to foster their personal
interests rather than the interests of public security holders.88
The SEC argues that this unique concern with liquid, easily looted assets
justifies including within the Investment Company Act definition of "security"
instruments that are liquid and negotiable but would not be securities under other
federal statutes. 8 9
The SEC's argument overstates the legislative history. Just prior to his
statement quoted above, Commissioner Healy indicated that most investment
companies of the time had "the major portion of their investments in so-called
blue chips, the securities that are readily salable on the exchanges .. ."90 It was
these assets-blue chip stocks-that Commissioner Healy was indicating were
easy to loot 91 In addition, many of the problems Commissioner Healy
specifically mentioned as justifying the proposed investment company regulation
had little to do with the liquidity of the underlying securities. 92 The same can be
said of the House and Senate reports. The problems noted in each report have
more to do with the structure of investment companies than with the liquidity of
their assets 93 and each report mentions common stocks as the primary investment
94
of investment companies.
The SEC reports to Congress on the investment company industry also make
it clear that the portfolios of investment companies and investment trusts, both in
the U.S. and Britain, were concentrated in ordinary stocks and bonds.9 5 In fact
the SEC reports, which one treatise has termed "an integral part of the Act's
legislative history," 96 sometimes use the term "security" to mean only stocks and
bonds. For example, Part II of the SEC's Investment Trust Study, submitted to
Congress in 1939, states:

88

S. REP. No. 76-1775, at 6 (1940). The language in the House Report is similar.
Yee H.R. REP. No. 76-2639, at 7 (1940).
89 See infraPart V.
90
House Hearings,supranote 73, at 57.
91 Seeid at 57.
92

See id at 58-62.

93

See S. REP. No. 76-1775, supra note 88, at 7-11; H.R. REP. No. 76-2639,
ipranote 85, at 8-9.
94
See S. REP. No. 76-1775, supra note 88, at 2; H.R. REP. No. 76-2639, supra note 88,

6.

95

See H.R. Doc. NO. 77-246, at 333-34 (1941); H.R. Doc. No. 76-482, at 19 (1939);
R. Doc. No. 76-476, at 17 (1939); H.R. Doc. No. 76-380, at 51-52 (1939); H.R. Doc. No.
-279, at 35 (1939); H.R. Doc. NO. 76-70, at 527 (1939); H.R. Doc. No. 75-707, passim
)38).
96 1 LENKEETAL, supranote 16, § 2.03.
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At the end of 1936, the estimated market value of the security investments
of all 558 investment trusts and companies known to be then in existence,
excluding investments in subsidiaries, amounted to approximately
$4,055,000,000, of which $3,560,000,000 or 88% of the total security
investments consisted of common stocks, $245,000,000 or 6% of which was in
preferred stocks, and $250,000,000 or 6% was in bonds.97
Thus, both Congress and the SEC appear to have been most concerned about
stocks and bonds. In any event, the general policy statements quoted by the SEC
cannot overcome the clear, direct statements in the legislative history: the term
"security" in the Investment Company Act was intended to have the "same
meaning" as in the earlier federal securities statutes.
B. The 1982 Amendments
In 1982, Congress amended the federal securities laws to make it clear that
options on securities are also securities.9 8 The amendments were part of an accord
between the SEC and the Commodities Futures Trading Commission to resolve a
jurisdictional dispute concerning options and futures.9 9 The amendments added to
the definition of "security," to quote from the House committee report, "options
on securities, options on certificates of deposit, options on securities indices or
groups, and, when traded on a national securities exchange, options on foreign
10 0
currency."
The Investment Company Act amendment differed slightly from the
amendments to the Securities Act and the Exchange Act. The language added to
the Securities Act and the Exchange Act covers, in relevant part, "any put, call,
straddle, option, or privilege on any security, certificate of deposit, or group or
index of securities." 10 1 The language added to the Investment Company Act, on
the other hand, reads, "any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege on any security
(including a certificate of deposit)."'1 2 The use of the alternative "or" in the
Securities Act and the Exchange Act appears to recognize that, after Marine
Bank, certificates of deposit may not be securities (any security or certificate of
deposit). The language added to the Investment Company Act, on the other hand,
seems to acknowledge that certificates of deposit are included within the term
97

H.R. Doc. NO. 76-279, at 35 (1939); H.R. DOC. No. 76-70, at 527 (1939). But see H.R.

Doc. No. 76-70, at 64 n.49 (stating that in analyzing investment company assets, "notes

secured by real estate mortgages have been treated as securities").
98

See Act of Oct. 13, 1982, Pub. L. 97-303, 96 Stat. 1409 (1982).
99 See H.R. REP. No. 97-626, pt. 2, at 2 (1982); S. REP. No. 97-390, at 4 (1982).
10 0
H.R REP. No. 97-626, pt. 1, at 9.
101 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b(a)(1), 78c(a)(10) (1994 & Supp. 11I 1997) (emphasis added).
102 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(36) (1994). The language in the Investment Advisers Act is the
same. See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(18) (1994) (emphasis added).
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"security."
The 1982 amendments probably were meant to endorse the SEC's position
that certificates of deposit are securities for purposes of the Investment Company
Act, 103 but the statute and the legislative history are a little ambiguous even on
this point. The amendment does not directly state that certificates of deposit are
securities; it provides only that options on certificates of deposit are securities.
The SEC's Marine Bank position is supported only by implication: since the
parenthetical treats certificates of deposit as securities to determine when an
option is a security, certificates of deposit must be securities for all purposes. The
SEC was not bold enough to insert into its jurisdictional accord with the CFTC
separate language unrelated to the options and futures dispute that led to the
legislation.
The legislative history is also unclear, although the ambiguity may have been
intended to bolster the SEC's position that certificates of deposit were securities
even prior to the amendment. The Joint Explanatory Statement submitted by the
SEC and the CFTC to accompany the 1982 amendments says that:
Although the status of certificates of deposit as securities under
the... Securities Act... and the Exchange Act is not free from doubt,
certificates of deposit have consistently been considered "securities" for the

purposes of the Investment Company Act of 1940. In order to emphasize that no
change in current law is contemplated, the legislative language used in the two
circumstances differs. 104

When the bill was submitted in 1982, it was true that the SEC's consistent
position was that, for purposes of the Investment Company Act, certificates of
deposit were securities. 10 5 However, the only two cases to consider the issue had
held that certificates of deposit were not within the Investment Company Act
definition of "security." 10 6 Further, not a single reported case (including Marine
Bank) had even stated in dictum that the definition of "security" under the
Investment Company Act differed from the definitions under the Securities Act
and the Exchange Act. Cases involving claims under the Investment Company
Act and other federal securities laws had assumed without discussion that the
definitions were the same.10 7 Thus, the Joint Explanatory Statement is a little
103 See Jacobs, supra note 31, at 398 n.1197; George F. Jones, Footnote 11 of Marine
Bank v. Weaver: Will UnconventionalCertificates ofDepositBe Held Securities?,24 Hous. L.
REV. 491,507 n.109 (1987).

104 Securities-CommoditiesAccord Amendments of1982: Hearingon S.2260 Before the
Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 97th
Cong. 9-10 n.3 (1982) (emphasis added).
10 5

See supratext accompanying notes 28-43.
106 See infra text accompanying notes 118-21.
107 See infra text accompanying notes 116-17.
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disingenuous.
The difference in the statutory language was not discussed in any testimony
before the committees considering the bill, 10 8 nor was it mentioned in floor
debate.10 9 The House and Senate reports on the bill mention the difference in the
Investment Company Act language, but they merely echo the SEC/CFTC
statement The Senate Report merely notes that the Investment Company Act
language "would recognize that the underlying certificates of deposit clearly are
securities for the purpose of the Investment Company Act" 11 0 The House Report
adopts the SEC statement111 with a slight modification that makes it more
accurate. The House Report first recognizes that the status of certificates of
deposit under the Securities Act and the Exchange Act "has not been completely
free from doubt."1 12 It goes on: "However, certificates of deposit consistently
have been considered 'securities' by the [SEC] for the purposes of the Investment
Company Act. In order to emphasize that no changein currentlaw in this regard
is contemplated, the legislative language used in the two circumstances differs
slightly." 13
This change indicates that the Congressional staffs dealing with the 1982
amendments probably were not misled by the Joint Explanatory Statement. But
the effect of the 1982 amendments on the SEC's position is still subject to some
doubt. On the one hand, the language in the Investment Company Act implies
that certificates of deposit are securities. On the other hand, the House Report
indicates that "no change in current law.. . [was] contemplated,' 1 4 and the
Senate Report expresses a belief that the result was already clear. Moreover, the
amendment does not make certificates of deposit securities; the amendment is, at
best, merely the 1982 Congress's interpretation of what the rest of the definition
means. In the Central Bank case, the Supreme Court cautioned that "the
10 8 See generally ClarifyJurisdictionofSEC andDefinition ofSecurity: Hearingson HR.

6156 Before the Subcomm. on Conservation, Credit, and Rural Development of the House
Comm. on Agriculture, 97th Cong. (1982); SEC/CFTCJurisdictionalIssues and OversightPart1: Hearingson HR. 5447,5515, and 6156Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications,
Consumer Protection,and Finance and the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the
House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 97th Cong. (1982); Securities-CommoditiesAccord
Amendments of 1982: Hearings on S. 2260 Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate
Comm. on Banking,Housing, and Urban Affairs, 97th Cong. (1982).
109 See 128 CONG. REC. 24,908 to 24,914 (1982) (House consideration of H.R. 6156);
128 CONG. REc. 26,861 to 26,863 (Senate consideration of H.R. 6156).
11
o S. REP. No. 97-390, at 8 (1982).
111 This statement should undoubtedly be attributed to the SEC even though it appears in
a joint SEC/CFTC statement. The CFTC had no reason to be concerned about whether

certificates of deposit are securities under the Investment Company Act.
112
H.R. REP. No. 97-626, pt. 1, at 10 (1982) (citing Marine Bank v. Weaver,
455 U.S. 551 (1982)).
113 Id. (emphasis added).
1 14

Id.

1014

OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL

[Vol. 60:3

interpretation given by one Congress (or a committee or Member thereof) to an
earlier statute is of little assistance in discerning the meaning of that statute.' 1 15 If
a court would have decided prior to the 1982 amendments that certificates of
deposit were not intended by the 1940 Congress to be treated as securities, are the
1982 amendments really sufficient to change that conclusion? Even if the 1982
amendments make certificates of deposit securities for purposes of the Investment
Company Act, neither the amendments nor their legislative history answer the
broader question posed in this Article: for instruments other than certificates of
deposit (such as commercial notes), does "security" have a different meaning in
the Investment Company Act?
IV. JUDICIAL AUTHORITY FOR THE SEC's PosITION
A. Introduction
Aside from the ambiguous language in footnote 11 of the MarineBank
opinion, not a single case supports the SEC position that the Investment Company
Act definition of "security" differs from the definitions in the other federal
securities statutes. To the contrary, the case law supports the view that "security"
is the same under all the federal statutes, including the Investment Company Act.
Several lower federal court cases involving claims under the Investment
Company Act and one or more of the other federal securities statutes have simply
assumed that the definitions of "security" are coextensive, addressing whether an
instrument is a security without distinguishing among the different statutory
claims. 116 At least one case, noting that the Investment Company Act definition is
identical to the Securities Act definition, has indicated that a determination that an
instrument is a security for Securities Act purposes "applies with equal force
under the Investment Company Act."1 17 Unless one accepts the SEC argument
that the Marine Bank footnote adopts their position, not a single case has even
hinted that the Investment Company Act definition of "security" differs from the
other definitions of "security."
115 Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 185 (1994)
(quoting Public Employees Retirement System of Ohio v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158, 168 (1989)).
116
See Dubach v. Weitzel, 135 F3d 590, 592-93 (8th Cir. 1998) (discussing claims under
the Securities Act, the Exchange Act, and the Investment Company Act); SEC v. R.G.

Reynolds Enter., Inc., 952 F.2d 1125, 1130-35 (9th Cir. 1991) (discussing claims under the
Securities Act, the Exchange Act, the Investment Company Act, and the Investment Advisers
Act); Olpin v. Ideal Nat'l Ins. Co., 419 F.2d 1250, 1263 (10th Cir. 1969) (discussing claims
under the Exchange Act and the Investment Company Act); SEC v. United Benefit Life Ins.
Co., 359 F.2d 619, at 621,623 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (discussing claims under the Securities Act and
the Investment Company Act); see also Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 463 F.2d 1075, 107780 (7th Cir. 1972) (looking to the other federal securities statutes, including the Investment
Company Act, to help determine the meaning of "security" in the Exchange Act).
117 SEC v. American Bd. of Trade, Inc., 593 F. Supp. 335,340 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
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B. CertificatesofDeposit as Securities
On the specific question that has troubled the SEC in many of its no-action
letters-whether certificates of deposit are securities under the Investment
Company Act-the only two cases to address the question prior to the 1982
amendment concluded that they were not. In SEC v. Fifth Avenue Coach Lines,
Inc.,118 the court held that certificates of deposit should be treated as cash items
and not as "securities" for the purpose of calculating whether investment
securities were forty percent of a company's total assets.1 19 And, in DroversBank
of Chicago v. SFC Corp.,120 Drovers Bank argued that two companies to which
its predecessor sold certificates of deposit were investment companies required to
register under the Investment Company Act The court held that certificates of
deposit issued by a federally regulated bank were not securities for purposes of
the Investment Company Act.12 1 The government even cited this case favorably
in its Marine Bank amicus brief,122 an inconsistency that another amicus brief
noted. 123 The closest the SEC has come to obtaining a judicial holding that
certificates of deposit are securities under the Investment Company Act was a
pre-Marine Bank consent judgment involving the same parties as the Drovers
124
Bank case.
The cases involving certificates of deposit may have been implicitly
overruled by the 1982 amendments, but they still reject the SEC's more general
non-equivalence position that the definition of "security" in the Investment
Company Act differs from the definitions of "security" in the other federal
securities statutes. Moreover, since the SEC adopted its non-equivalence position
prior to the 1982 amendments, these cases show that the SEC position was
contrary to the case law at the time.
C. Marine Bank Footnote 11 and the Meaningof the "'Context"Language
The only judicial support the SEC can muster for its non-equivalence position
is footnote II in Marine Bank. Footnote 11 may be responsive to the
government's plea for different treatment under the Investment Company Act, or
it may only recognize the government's more general argument that some
118 289 F. Supp. 3,31-33 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), aff'd,435 F.2d 510 (2d Cir. 1970).
119 See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(a)(IXC) (1994 & Supp. III 1997) (amending 15 U.S.C. § 80a3(a)(3) (1994)).
120 452 F. Supp. 580 (N.D. Ill.
1978).
121 See id at 582.
122

See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supranote 33, at 20 n32.
123 See Brief for Myma Ayala as Amicus Curiae in support of the Respondents at 18,
Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551 (1982) (No. 80-1562).
12 4
See SEC v. American Deposit Trust Co., [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 96,808, at 95,171 (Mar. 12, 1979).
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instruments labeled "certificates of deposit" could be securities. 125 It is important
to remember that footnote 11 does not say that "security" is defined differently
under the Investment Company Act. It says, in its entirety:
It does not follow that a certificate of deposit or business agreement between
transacting parties invariably falls outside the definition of a 'security' as defined
by the federal statutes. Each transaction must be analyzed and evaluated on the
basis of the content of the instruments in question, the purposes intended to be
served, and the factual setting as a whole. 126
Some of the elements of footnote 11 are not completely in accord with the
SEC's position. Notice the reference to "the definition of a 'security' as defined
by the federal statutes." 127 The Court seems to be referring to a single, unitary
definition, not different definitions under different securities statutes. Moreover,
the second sentence of footnote 11 calls for analysis and evaluation of "[e]ach
transaction," 128 implying that an instrument either is or is not a security within
each transaction. This cuts against a necessary result of the SEC's position-that
a single instrument can be both a security and not a security in the same
transaction. 129 Finally, the Court indicates three elements to be considered in
evaluating each transaction: (1) the content of the instruments; (2) the purposes to
be served; (3) "and the factual setting as a whole." 130 The Court says nothing
about the statute under which the claim is made, a curious omission if, as the SEC
contends, footnote 11 was meant to adopt the position advocated in the
government's amicus brief. At best, footnote 11 merely leaves the issue open.
The context clause in the Investment Company Act and in the other federal
securities statutes introduces the definitions with the qualifying phrase, "unless
125

See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 33, at 21-22.
The government's amicus brief argued that:
The better reasoned decisions of the lower courts do not view the question whether a
certificate of deposit is a security in the abstract, or inlight of the labels attached to a given
instrument, but instead turn to a careful consideration of the context ....
One context in which a different result might be appropriate is the issuance of
certificates of deposit by bank-type entities that are not regulated. The SEC believes that,
in such situations, bank-type institutions should not be treated differently than other
business corporations that seek capital to conduct business operations through the sale of
interest bearing debt obligations.
Id.
126 Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551,560 n.11 (1982).
127 Id.

128 Id.
129 See infra Part IV.D.
130
MarineBank, 455 U.S. at 560 n.11.
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the context otherwise requires."' 13 1 Other cases interpreting footnote 11 of Marine
Bank and the related context language in the statute do not support the SEC's
position. Since Marine Bank, the Supreme Court "has... pretended that the
context clause does not exist."'132 In Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth,133 the
Court mentioned "tfhe context of the transaction," 134 but ultimately held that
ordinary corporate stock was a security, regardless of context. 135 In Reves v. Ernst
& Young, 136 the majority did not discuss the context clause at all, although the
137
Reves test for whether a note is a security depends on the transactional context.
Other authorities differ in their interpretation of the context language, but
none of these interpretations provides much support for the SEC's position. One
line of authorities interprets the clause narrowly to apply only when "in the case
of a frequently occurring statutory term, its immediate context suggests that a
literal application of the statutory definition would produce absurd consequences
or run counter to the obvious thrust of the section... "138 This line of cases
certainly does not support the SEC's position: nothing in the Investment
Company Act compels the conclusion that "security" must be defined more
broadly to avoid an absurd result. Nor does the usual definition of "security" run
counter to anything in the definition of "investment company" or other sections of
the Investment Company Act that turn on the meaning of "security."
The second line of authorities, of which Marine Bank is the most prominent
example, interprets "context" to include market or regulatory circumstances
outside the Act itself.139 There is a split among those who support this broader
131 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a) (1994 & Supp. 1I 1997).
at 1085 n.216.
133 471 U.S. 681 (1985).
132 McGinty, supranote 29,
134 Id. at 687.
135

See Marc I. Steinberg & William E. Kaulbach, The Supreme Court and the Definition
of "Security". The "Context" Clause, "Investment Contract" Analysis, and Their
Ramifications, 40 VAND. L. REV. 489,491 (criticizing Landreth for "forfeit[ing] an opportunity
to elaborate the precise role of 'context' analysis:").

136 494 U.S. 56 (1990).
13 7
See id at 66-67; see also McGinty, supra note 29, at 1085 n.216 ("[The context
clause was the only plausible mechanism for reconciling Reves' multi-factored test with the
Acts' statutory language.").
13 8

Lowenfels & Bromberg, supra note 26, at 484 (quoting American Bankers Ass'n v.

SEC, 804 F.2d 739, 753 (D.C. Cir. 1986)). For arguments that this textual view of the context
clause is more consistent with the legislative histories of the federal securities laws, see Gary S.
Rosin, HistoricalPerspectives on the Definition of a Security, 28 S. TEX. L. REV. 577, at 579,
587-90 (1987); Steinberg & Kaulbach, supra note 135, at 504-05. But see 2 Louiss Loss &
JOEL SELIGMAN, SEcuRrrms REGULATION 874 (3d ed. 1989) (noting some support in the

legislative history of the Securities Act for reading "context" to include factual context).
13 9
See Lowenfels & Bromberg, supra note 26, at 483. Lowenfels and Bromberg

conclude that either view of the context clause is supportable, and that a court's choice will be
influenced primarily by the result that the court wishes to reach for other reasons. See id.at 488;
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view of the context language. Some authorities argue that the relevant inquiry is
"into the factual context in which the subject transaction arises. ' 140 Others
characterize the Supreme Court's approach "as testing the legislative and
regulatory 'context' of the transaction, the question being whether in light of other
federal protections affecting the transaction, Congress would have intended the
securities laws to apply." 14 1 Neither view supports the SEC's position that
"security" has a broader meaning under the Investment Company Act When a
fund purchases an instrument, the factual context is the same whether a claim
arises under the Investment Company Act or another federal securities statute.
The factual context might justify applying a broader or narrower definition of
"security" to the particular transaction, but would not justify applying a different
142
definition depending on the statute under which the claim is made.
The Securities Act and the Exchange Act definitions sections also contain
"context' language, 143 and those two statutes differ in their regulatory concerns.
Initially, the Supreme Court relied on these context clauses to argue that the
definitions in the Securities Act and in the Exchange Act were not necessarily
identical. In SEC v. Natl Securities, Inc.,144 the Court had to construe the
meaning of the phrase "purchase or sale" in Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act
1 45
The Court rejected an argument based on an SEC Securities Act rule.
Conceding that "the interdependence of the various sections of the securities laws
is certainly a relevant factor in any interpretation of the language Congress has
chosen," 146 the Court noted that "Congress itself has cautioned that the same
words may take on a different coloration in different sections of the securities
see also William I Carney, Defining a Security: The Addition ofa Market-OrientedContextual
Approach to Investment ContractAnalysis, 33 EMORY LJ. 311, 330-31 (1984) (approving this

market context approach, but describing its context clause justification as "tenuous");
Williamson B. C. Chang, Meaning,Reference, and Reification in the Definition of a Security,
19 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 403, 431-32 (1986) (approving the transactional context approach);
McGinty, supra note 26, at 1087 (approving a narrow use of this approach "whenever the
legislative purpose would be transgressed by a literal interpretation.").
14 0
M. Thomas Arnold, "When Is a Cara Bicycle? "And OtherRiddles: The Definition of
a Security Under the FederalSecuritiesLaws, 33 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 449,460 (1984-1985).
141 Adena Exploration, Inc. v. Sylvan, 860 F.2d 1242, 1250 (5th Cir. 1988).
142
The SEC has argued that the term "security" should include certificates of deposit
because federal deposit insurance does not adequately protect investors in investment
companies. See, e.g., Merrill Lynch, supra note 44, at 78,151. The protection against the risk
associated with the instrument itself is identical in the investment company context. If the bank
fails, the certificate of deposit will still be paid. Having the investment company hold the
certificate of deposit as an intermediary imposes additional risks, but those risks are irrelevant to
the question of whether the certificate of deposit is a security. See infra Part V.B.2.
143 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b(a), 78c(a) (1994 & Supp. It 1997).
144 393 U.S. 453 (1969).
14 5
See id at 465-66.
14

6 Id. at 466.
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laws; both the [Securities Act and the Exchange Act] preface their lists of general
definitions with the phrase 'unless the context otherwise requires." '147
The Court has abandoned this early position, at least as to the definition of
security. The Supreme Court has noted in several cases that the definition of
security in the Exchange Act is "virtually identical" to the definition in the
Securities Act, and has consistently treated the coverage of the two statutes as the
same. 148 The Supreme Court has not expressly compared the definition of
"security" in the Investment Company Act to these other definitions, but it also
has made no attempt to distinguish the language in the Investment Company
Act,14 9 and, as pointed out earlier, the Investment Company Act definition of
security tracks the Securities Act language even more closely than the Exchange
Act definition does. It is therefore likely that the definitions of "security" in the
Securities Act and the Investment Company Act will also be interpreted
identically, at least as to everything other than certificates of deposit.
D. JudicialRejection of OscillatingSecuri/tyNon-SecurityStatus
Under the SEC's position, the character of a particular instrument as a
security changes from day to day, from transaction to transaction, and even within
the same transaction. For example, assume an individual purchases a federally
insured certificate of deposit from a regulated national bank and puts that
certificate of deposit in a safe. Marine Bank tells us that the certificate of deposit
is not a security. On the next day, the individual sells several friends instruments
that grant the friends a percentage share of the certificate of deposit when it
matures. Under the SEC's view, the certificate of deposit, which sat unchanged in
the safe the whole time, has been miraculously transformed into a security. 150 Or
has it? It still is not a security as between the original purchaser and the bank. The
certificate of deposit mystically oscillates between security and non-security
status, depending on who examines it, when, and for what purpose.
The idea that identical instruments may be securities in one sale but not in
14 7

Id.
See Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 61 n.1 (1990); Landreth Timber Co. v.
Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 686 n.1 (1985); United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837,
847 n.12 (1975); Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 335-36 (1967); see also Gustafson v.
Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561,573 (1995) (rejecting the idea that a term may mean one thing in one
148

section of the Securities Act and something different in another).

149 See SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. of Am., 359 U.S. 65 (1959) (not

distinguishing Securities Act and the Investment Company Act claims in discussing whether
annuity contract are entitled to an insurance exemption).
150 But see Brief for Myma Ayala as Amicus Curiae in support of the Respondents, supra

note 123, at 18 (criticizing the SEC position for its result that "CD's [sic] when bought and sold
are not 'securities,' but once they come to rest and are held, they are magically transmuted into
'securities.").

1020

OHIOSTATELAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 60:3

another is not unprecedented. 15 1 That is an inevitable result of Marine Bank's
contextual approach to the definition of security. It is also not unprecedented for a
court to consider what might happen to an instrument after its initial sale to
determine if it is a security. 152 But the SEC's position results in the same
instrument both being and not being a security in the same transaction. It is
difficult to see how even the "context" language justifies differing treatment of
the same instrument in the same transaction. The "context" is the individual's
purchase of the certificates of deposit. That the issuer is also selling a separate
security-in this case, the participations-has nothing to do with the context of
what the issuer is purchasing.In dssence, the SEC is attempting to collapse the
statutory requirements that an investment company both issue and purchase
153
securities into a single requirement that the company issue securities.
The Supreme Court has strongly rejected the type of uncertainty that the
151 See Carl W. Schneider, The Elusive Definition ofa "Security "--1990Update,24 REv.
SEC. & COMMOD. REG. 13, 19 (1991); see also Robert C. Art, Sell a Condominium, Buy a
Securities Lawsuit: UnwarrantedLiabilities in the Secondary Market, 53 Oino ST. LJ. 413,
435-38 (1992) (rejecting the "once a security, always a security" view with respect to
condominium units, but indicating that the view could be correct for indivisible instruments
such as bank certificates of deposit).
152
See Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 66 (1990) (determining whether a note is a
security, by asking, inter alia whether there is '"common trading for speculation or
investment'") (quoting SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344,353 (1943)).
153 The SEC's argument in this regard is analogous to attempts to invoke Section 10(b) of
the Exchange Act by bootstrapping a purchase or sale of a security to related fraudulent conduct
that is not "in connection with the purchase or sale of any security." Taylor v. First Union
Corp., 857 F.2d 240, 245-46 (4th Cir. 1988); see also Chemical Bank v. Arthur Andersen &
Co., 726 F.2d 930, 941-44 (2d Cir. 1984); Ketchum v. Green, 557 F.2d 1022, 1027-28 (3d Cir.
1977); see generally Daniel A. McLaughlin, The "In Connection With" Requirement of Rule
J0b-5 as an ExpectationStandard,26 SEC. REG. L.i. 3 (1998); C. Edward Fletcher, III, The "In
Connection With" Requirement of Rule l0b-5, 16 PEPP. L. REv. 913 (1989). The fact that a
security is being purchased or sold in proximity to the fraud does not make the fraud securities
fraud. Similarly, the fact that an issuer is selling a security does not make the risk associated
with what the issuer is purchasing an Investment Company Act risk. The SEC's policy
argument to the contrary, based on Congress' desire to protect against investment risk, is
analogous to an argument that Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act was designed to protect
against fraud, and therefore, every instrument that presents a risk of fraud must be a security.
However:
[Tlhe type of conduct that the Acts prohibit and the definition of "security" are unrelated,
except to the extent that a security must be present for the antifraud provisions to apply.
Observations about one have no bearing on conclusions about the other. A finding that
fraud has occurred in a particular factual situation does not in itself qualify the transaction
involved as a security; likewise, the mere presence ofa security will not expose a party to a
transaction to liability under the antifraud provisions absent evidence of prohibited
conduct
Steinberg & Kaulbach, supranote 135, at 526-27.
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SEC's oscillating. definition of security would create. In Gould v. Ruefenacht,154
the respondent argued that corporate stock should not be a security if the
purchaser acquired control of the corporation. One of the reasons the court
rejected this so-called sale-of-business doctrine was that its application "would
lead to arbitrary distinctions between transactions covered by the [federal
securities statutes] and those that are not."155 The Court pointed out that, under
the proposed doctrine, a corporation's stock could be a security as to one party to
the transaction, but not as to the other.156 Further, in several identical transactions
involving the same individual, the stock could be a security in some of the
transactions, but not in others. 157 The Court concluded that "[s]uch distinctions
158
make little sense in view of the Acts' purpose to protect investors."
Marine Bank rejected a similar transactional argument. The respondents in
MarineBank argued that, although the certificate of deposit may not have been a
security when the Weavers purchased it from the bank, it became a security when
it was pledged back to the bank to guarantee the bank's loan. 159 In a footnote, the
Supreme Court summarily dismissed the argument that a single instrument could
160
be a security in one transaction but not in another.
Two circuit court cases since Marine Bank have held that federally insured
certificates of deposit can be securities when those certificates are marketed by
intermediaries. 161 In each case, the court concluded that the efforts of the
company marketing the certificates of deposit added value to the product that
made the program different from an ordinary certificate of deposit. 162 Similarly,
154 471 U.S. 701 (1985). This was the companion case to Landreth Timber Co. v.
Landreth,471 U.S. 681 (1985) (rejecting the sale-of-business doctrine also).

Gould,471 U.S. at 705.
1 See id at 706.
155
56

15 7

See id

15

8 Id.
159
Respondent's Brief in Opposition to Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 8-9, Marine
Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551 (1982) (No. 80-1562); Brief for Respondents at 34-38,
MarineBank, 455 U.S. at 551 (No. 80-1562).
160

'We reject respondents' argument that the certificate of deposit was somehow
transformed into a security when it was pledged, even though it was not a security when
purchased." MarineBank, 455 U.S. at 559 n.9.
161 See Olson v. E. F. Hutton & Co., 957 F.2d 622, 628-29 (8th Cir. 1992); Gary Plastic
Packaging Corp. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 756 F.2d 230,240-42 (2d Cir.
1985).
162 In Gary Plastic,Merrill Lynch, the program sponsor, investigated and monitored the

CD issuers, marketed the CDs, and maintained a resale market. See 756 F.2d at 240-41. The
court concluded that "Plaintiff's decision to invest is obviously made in reliance upon the
efforts, knowledge and skill of Merrill Lynch. This is a significant factor that sets this case apart
from MarineBank" Id. at 241. In Olson, the account representative provided expert advice to
the plaintiffs concerning purchases and sales prior to maturity to profit from interest rate
fluctuations. See 957 F.2d at 628-29.
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commercial notes, or participations in commercial notes, that are resold to
investors may in certain circumstances be securities even though the original
notes were not.163 The results in these cases often depend on the purchaser. if the
purchaser is a member of the general investing public, rather than another
commercial lender, the participation may be treated as a security.l 64 An
investment program that purchases certificates or notes, then sells participations in
those instruments to investors, could be adding similar value and, therefore, be
165
selling securities.
These cases do not support the SEC's non-equivalence position, however.
They deal with whether the investment the intermediary is selling to investors
(i.e., the participation or the "enhanced" certificate of deposit) is a security. To be
an investment company, the find must not only be issuing securities, but
purchasing them as well. These cases do not hold that the intermediary is
purchasing securities when it acquires the certificates of deposit or the notes.
These cases concern only the product sold to the ultimate investor.
Moreover, if these cases applied, the SEC's non-equivalence position would
be unnecessary. These cases involve the Securities Act and the Exchange Act
definitions of "security." To the extent they apply, there is no need to argue that
the Investment Company Act definition is broader. The SEC's non-equivalence
argument is necessary only because the cases under the Securities Act and
Exchange Act do not support its position.
V. THE POLICY ARGUMENT FOR THE SEC's PosmoN
The SEC's argument that "security" has a broader meaning in the Investment
Company Act than in the Securities Act or the Exchange Act is not based
primarily on the language of the statutes, legislative history, or case law. As
163

See Nancy A. Brown & Jonathan E. Breckenridge, Notes Qualifying as Securities in
the Wake ofReves: Recent Developments, 31 REv. SEC. & COMMOD. REG. 1, 2-5 (1998) and
cases cited therein; Janet Kerr & Karen M. Eisenhauer, Reves Revisited, 19 PEPP. L. REV. 1123,
1155 (1992), and cases cited therein. See generally Robert F. Komegay, Jr., Bank Loans as
Securities: A Legal and FinancialEconomic Analysis of the Treatment of MarketableBank
Assets Under the SecuritiesActs, 40 UCLA L. REV. 799 (1993); Richard Y. Roberts & Randall
W. Quinn, Leveling the PlayingField: The Needfor InvestorProtectionfor Bank Sales of Loan
Participations,63 FORDHAM L. REV. 2115 (1995).
164 See Carl W. Schneider & Joshua D. Cohen, Reves v. Ernst & Young: A Note-Worthy
Departure in Defining "Security," 23 REV. SEC. & COMMOD. REG. 191, 200-01 (1990);
see also Brown & Breckenridge, supra note 163, at 8 ('The second factor highlighted by these
cases is the identity of the buyer, in many of them, the more sophisticated the buyer, the less
likely the transaction was to be characterized as a security.").
165 See generallyHarvey Bines & Steve Thel, Investment ManagementArrangementsand

the Federal Securities Laws, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 459 (1997) (discussing whether investment
management services offered to investors are securities and whether companies offering such
services are investment companies).
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shown above, the SEC essentially ignores the statutory language, relevant case
law, and directly relevant legislative history. The SEC's position is based instead
on policy, bolstered by the general statements in the legislative history concerning
the abuses the Investment Company Act was meant to control.
A. The SEC's Argument
The SEC and its staff have not consistently provided policy arguments for the
non-equivalence position. However, at least two potential policy arguments may
be gleaned from the SEC's pronouncements. One argument is rather simplistic
and does not really provide an independent policy justification for the SEC's
position. The second policy argument is more substantial.
First, the SEC points out that many registered investment companies,
especially money market funds, have their assets invested in instruments that
would not be securities under the Securities Act or the Exchange Act. If these
instruments, such as certificates of deposit and commercial notes, were not treated
as securities, some funds would be freed from regulation under the Investment
Company Act.166 It is true that money market funds are an important part of the
mutual fund world. As of September, 1999, the assets of U.S. money market
funds totaled around $1.5 trillion. 167 Undoubtedly, interpreting the term
"security" as it is interpreted under the Securities Act and the Exchange Act
would free some, but probably not all, perhaps not even most, of those funds from
regulation under the Investment Company Act.168 However, that alone does not
justify the SEC's position. To complete the argument, the SEC must explain why,
as a matter of policy, these funds should be regulated under the Investment
Company Act.169 Deregulation is detrimental only if there is some independent

166

See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 22-24, supra note 33; see also

DIvISION OF INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT, SEC, supra note 61, at 97.
167
See Investment Company Institute, Money Market Mutual Fund Assets:
September 16, 1999 <http'J/vww.ici.org/facts figures/trends_0999.html> (visited Oct. 28,
1999).
168 Some, perhaps many, public funds might choose to remain regulated, if that choice
was permitted. Regulation could signal these funds' continued soundness and safety to
investors and differentiate them from unregulated funds. Investment company status would also
allow them to use more favorable securities registration and marketing provisions available
only to investment companies. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.134(a)(3)(iii), 230A82 (1999);
New Disclosure Options for Open-End Management Inv. Cos., Securities Act Release
No. 7513, [1998 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 86,013 at 80,264 (Mar. 13, 1998).
169 Even if the instruments in which they are investing are not securities, those funds
would still be issuing securities to their own investors. Thus, they would not be freed of all
federal securities regulation. Like other issuers, those funds would still be subject to regulation
under the Securities Act and to antifiaud liability pursuant to Section 10(b) of the Exchange
Act.
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policy justification for regulating them. 170
The SEC's second argument attempts to provide a policy rationale for
continuing to regulate funds investing in instruments like certificates of deposit
and commercial paper. According to the SEC, the need for the Investment

Company Act arose primarily out of two characteristics of investment companies:
(1) the nature of their assets; and (2) the presence of the fund's management as an
intermediary between those assets and the fund's investors. Investment
companies' assets consist primarily of "assets [such as cash, stocks, and bonds]
which are completely liquid, mobile, and readily negotiable." 171 The investment
company stands as an intermediary between those liquid assets and the fund's
public investors, giving the fund's managers and employees an opportunity to
misappropriate or divert those assets. 172 The liquidity of those assets makes
misappropriation easier. According to the SEC, certificates of deposit and certain
other instruments not treated as securities under the Securities Act and the
Exchange Act are equally negotiable and liquid. Since the intermediation function
is the same, funds investing in those assets present the same risk to investors as
funds investing in "true" securities, 173 and therefore, the same need for protective
174
regulation exists.
170 As a practical matter, these funds probably would not be freed from substantive
regulation even if the SEC interpreted the term "security" properly. Congress might amend the
Investment Company Act to cover money market funds. Congressional action is far from
certain, however, given the current Congress's deregulatory mood with respect to securities
regulation. See National Securities Market Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-290, 110
Stat. 3416 (1996); Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. 104-67, 109 Stat.
737 (1995). But, even if Congress would be willing to "fix" the Act to the SEC's liking, that
would not excuse the SEC's present position. As an administrative agency, the SEC is charged
with administering the statutory scheme adopted by Congress. Its task is not to rewrite the
statute whenever it feels that what Congress adopted does not fulfill the statute's purpose.
If the SEC interpreted the term "security" to exclude the investments of money market
funds, state regulation would also be a possibility, and that regulation could be even more
restrictive than the Investment Company Act. In fact, a fear of state regulation may be why the
investment company industry has not pressed the "security" issue more forcefully. But it is also
not the SEC's job to rewrite federal statutes to preempt more restrictive state regulation. If state
regulation concerns Congress, it is capable of dealing with it. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 77r (1994 &
Supp. Ill1997) (preempting some state securities regulation); 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-3a, 80b-18a
(1994 & Supp. I1 1997) (preempting some state regulation of investment advisers).
171 Merrill Lynch, supra note 44, at 78,150 (quoting S. REP. No. 76-1775, at 6 (1940)).
For further discussion of the Senate Report, see supra note 88 and accompanying text; see also
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 23, supranote 33.
172 See Merrill Lynch, supranote 44, at 78,150.
173 1use the term "true securities" to refer to instruments that are within the definitions in
the Securities and Exchange Acts-securities as to which the SEC's non-equivalence argument
is not necessary for Investment Company Act coverage.
174 See Merrill Lynch, supra note 44, at 78,150; Brief for the United States as Anicus
Curiae at 23, supra note 33; see also TAMAR FRANKEL I THE REGULATION OF MoNEY
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B. Problemswith the SEC's PolicyArgument
The SEC's policy argument provides the strongest support for its nonequivalence position, but it is flawed: '"tue" securities do pose greater investment
risk than the types of instruments the SEC wants to expand the statutory definition
to include. In any event, the SEC's application of the definition of "security" in
the Investment Company Act is still overbroad, because it has treated even
instruments that are neither liquid nor readily negotiable as securities. But the
most important objection to the SEC's policy argument is that it is illegitimate. In
construing the term "security," the SEC is not writing on a blank slate; it is
constrained by what Congress has enacted. The SEC's policy argument is
inconsistent with the structure of the Act, and is essentially an attempt to rewrite
the statute through administrative interpretation.
1. A ComparisonofRisks
The SEC argues that instruments such as certificates of deposit and
commercial notes must be covered by the Investment Company Act because the
risk to fund investors is identical to the risk when a fund invests in true securities
such as stocks and bonds. To understand the flaws in that argument, one must first
understand the types of investment risk faced by investors in investment
companies, and how those risks differ from the risks faced by investors in other
companies. What is it about investment companies that justifies their special
regulation and, just as important, how did Congress structure the Investment
Company Act to cover investment companies but not ordinary business
corporations?
Investors in investment companies face two general types of risk. First, the
investor is purchasing an interest in a company-the investment company's
securities. Like any other corporate investor, an investment company investor
faces the risk that the management of that company will mismanage the
company's assets or divert those assets for personal gain. Call this corporate-level
risk primary investment risk. The second type of risk faced by an investment
company investor is that associated with the securities purchased by the
investment company. The investment company will use the investor's money to
purchase the securities of other companies, and those securities will fluctuate in
value, in part due to what the managers of those other companies do. The risk
associated with those securities is borne indirectly by the investment company's
security holders. Call this risk secondary investment risk. Primary investment risk
is internal to the investment company-it results mainly from the actions of the
investment company's own management Secondary investment risk is, at least in
part, external. The securities owned by the investment company will fluctuate in
MANAGERS: THE INVESTMENT COMPANY ACT AND THE INVESTMENT ADVISERS Acr 222 (1999

Supp.) (focusing on the similarity of the intermediation function).
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value for reasons external to the investment company.
Investments in any company, whether it is an investment company or an
ordinary operating business, involve both primary and secondary investment risk
No matter what assets a company controls, there is a primary investment risk that
those assets will be mismanaged or misappropriated. Corrupt managers can steal
widgets just as they can steal securities. All types of companies also involve at
least some secondary investment risk Whether a company owns securities or
widget-making machinery, the market value of those assets can fluctuate for
exogenous reasons.
Investment companies are regulated not because they involve a different type
of risk than other companies, but because they involve a greater degree of risk.
On average, because of the nature of the assets an investment company owns, the
magnitude of investment risks is greater in investment companies than in ordinary
operating companies. Securities, because of their liquidity and negotiability, are
more easily diverted by managers than many other assets. Because of this, an
investor's primary investment risk is greater in an investment company. And
securities fluctuate more in value for external reasons than many other assets.
Thus, an investor's secondary investment risk is greater in an investment
175
company.
The SEC's policy argument for expanding the Investment Company Act
definition of "security" recognizes the risk differential between investment
companies and other companies. The SEC essentially argues that the assets of a
company should be treated as "securities" whenever the level of risk to investors
approaches that of a typical investment company. But the SEC is simply wrong:
the risk to fund investors is less for instruments such as certificates of deposit and
commercial notes than for true securities.
The courts' restrictive reading of the term "security" under the other federal
securities statutes is due, at least in part, to the reduced risk of instruments such as
certificates of deposit and commercial notes.176 For example, a person purchasing
a federally insured certificate of deposit from a federally regulated bank bears less
risk than someone purchasing common stock because the federal regulation and
insurance protects the purchaser of the certificate of deposit. That reduced risk
carries over into the investment company context. An individual investing in a
fund holding certificates of deposit bears less risk than an individual investing in a
fund holding common stocks. The secondary investment risk is less because of
The liquidity of securities reduces this second risk differential to some extent. It is
much easier to unload an investment in securities than to unload an investment in widgetmaking
machinery.
176
175

See, e.g., Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 67 (1990) (stating that one factor in
determining whether a note is a security is "whether some factor such as the existence of
another regulatory scheme significantly reduces the risk of the instrument'); Marine Bank v.
Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 558-59 (1982). Of course, some particular certificate of deposit or note
might be more risky than a particular stock, but, on average, stocks are riskier.
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the federal insurance and bank regulation. The primary investment risk borne by
an investment company investor may also be less for funds investing in at least
some instruments that are not true securities. For example, a note is less likely to
be a security under the Reves test if there is no secondary trading market for the
note, 177 and the lack of a secondary market also makes it more difficult for an
investment company's managers to misappropriate the note. Traditional securities
like stocks or bonds, for which there are active trading markets, would be easier to
convert into cash and misappropriate than such a note.
Obviously, it is riskier to hold certificates of deposit and commercial notes
through an intermediary like an investment fund than it is to own them directly,
but that does not bolster the SEC's argument It is riskier to hold any asset,
security or not, through an intermediary. The relevant comparison is between true
securities held through a fund and other instruments held through a fund. The risk
associated with the instruments that the SEC wants to expand the "security" net to
include is, on average, less than the risk associated with true securities. Therefore,
even if risk is relevant in determining whether an instrument is a "security" under
the Investment Company Act, the SEC's argument that the risk to investment
company investors is the same is simply wrong.
2. Overbreadth
Surprisingly, the SEC staff has sometimes ignored its own "liquid, negotiable
asset" rationale when it proves too constricting. Its response to Harrell
International's no-action request 178 is a prime example of this overreaching.
Harrell International's main asset was a $3.1 million note secured by the assets of
another company, whose financial condition was shaky. Harrell argued that it
should not be treated as an investment company, because the note was neither
readily negotiable nor liquid, and therefore was not a security. 179 The SEC staff
denied Harrell's no-action request, and its denial rejects the SEC's own rationale
for treating such instruments as securities: "[T]he fact that a security is not readily
marketable does not make it any the less a security for purposes of the 1940
Act. '18 0 Thus, it appears that the SEC staff is willing to use the "liquidity and
marketability" test to broaden the definition of security and expand its
jurisdiction, but it is not willing to be consistent and accept the contrary argument
that illiquid and unmarketable instruments are not securities.
177

See Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 66 (1990) (stating that one relevant factor
in determining whether a note is a security is whether there is" common trading for speculation

or investment") (citation omitted).
178

See Harrell Int'l, Inc., supranote 60.
See id at *1,*3.
180
Id. at *5; see also Gruson & Jackson, supra note 52, at 209-12 (criticizing the SEC
position that the commercial loans of foreign banks are securities, because those loans are not
liquid or readily negotiable).
179
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3. The Legitimacy ofPolicy-BasedArguments
The strongest objection to the SEC's policy argument is that it misconstrues
the structure of the Investment Company Act. In determining what "security"
means, the SEC and its staff are not writing on a blank slate; they are interpreting
a statute. They are bound by the terms of that statute, no matter what policy
concerns they may have.
The essence of the SEC argument is that, if the underlying assets owned by a
company are liquid and negotiable, they must be treated as securities so investors
can be protected. But many corporate assets are relatively liquid and present an
opportunity for management misappropriation-not just securities and financial
instruments, but also cash, accounts receivable, some types of intellectual
property, and many types of inventory. Congress in the Investment Company Act
did not choose to regulate the risks associated with all liquid assets, even though
the policy concerns are similar; it chose to regulate only the risks associated with
a company's investment in securities.And it used a familiar definition to limit the
scope of its regulation-the definition of security that already appeared in both
the Securities Act and the Exchange Act. Only investments in "securities" trigger
the Investment Company Act. 181 Redefining the term "security" so that it
includes every transaction where investor protection is needed does an injustice to
the language in the definitional section and deprives regulated parties of fair
warning about when the Act applies. 182
Rewriting the statute so that the definition of "security" covers all of the
investment risk that currently concerns the SEC is a job for Congress, not the
SEC.183 If Congress believes the current definition of "security" is insufficient to
protect investors from investment risks, Congress may broaden the definition.
Without direction from Congress, the SEC may not.
181 For example, Chang states:
Since only securities can trigger the securities acts, then, at least in part, a security
must be an item or instrument defined by sources of law outside the securities acts.
Otherwise, if the goals of the regulatory acts defined the triggering concept of a security,
then the acts would apply when ajudge decided in hindsight that the act's goals would be
served thereby, rather than when the parties activated the regulatory scheme by use of a
security.
Chang, supranote 139, at 421 (footnote omitted).
182 See id.at 422-23.
183 The Supreme Court may itself have rewritten the federal securities statutes by
restricting the definition of "security" to something narrower than what Congress intended in
1933, 1934, and 1940, but judicial infidelity to Congressional wishes does not excuse
administrative infidelity. The definitions in all of the statutes are ftnctionally identical and, once
the courts have construed those definitions, the SEC's recourse is either to follow the statute as
construed or seek congressional expansion.
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In recent cases, the Supreme Court has not been receptive to the use of policy
arguments and even legislative intent to override the language of the federal
securities statutes. The Court has indicated that the statutory language itself is
184
'the starting point in every case involving construction of a statute.'
Congressional intent is important, but '"[the ascertainment of congressional
intent.., must rest primarily on the language [of the particular section].' ' 18 5 The
federal securities laws cannot be read "more broadly than [their] language and the
'1 86
statutory scheme reasonably permit."
The most recent example of a Supreme Court securities case rejecting policy
arguments is CentralBank v. InterstateBank.187 In rejecting aiding-and-abetting
liability for violations of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act,the Court indicated
that "[p]olicy considerations cannot override our interpretation of the text and
structure of the Act, except to the extent that they may help to show that
adherence to the text and structure would lead to a result 'so bizarre' that
'
Congress could not have intended it.

l 88

Other cases have similarly rejected attempts to use policy arguments to
overcome statutory language. In Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,189 for example, the
SEC argued that liability under Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act should extend
to negligent conduct. The SEC contended that this expansive view of Section
10(b) was consistent with "the overall congressional purpose in the 1933 and
1934 Acts to protect investors against false and deceptive practices that might
injure them." 190 Since the effect on investors was the same whether the conduct
was negligent or intentional, the SEC argued that Congress "must have intended
to bar all such practices and not just those done knowingly or intentionally."' 19 1
The Court rejected this argument because it was inconsistent with the statutory
language: "[T]he Commission would add a gloss to the operative language of the
92
statute quite different from its commonly accepted meaning."'
Pinter v. Dah 193 rejected a similar type of argument. Pinter argued that
expanding the meaning of "seller" in Section 12 of the Securities Act would
184 Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197 (1976) (quoting Blue Chip Stamps v.
Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 756 (1975)).
185

Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 511 U.S. 164, 175 (1994) (quoting Pinter v.

Dahl, 486 U.S. 622,653 (1988)); see also Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462,472 (1977).
186 SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103, 116 (1978); see also Central Bank, 511 'U.S. at 174;
Pinter,486 U.S. at 653; Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222,234 (1980).
187 511 U.S. 164 (1994).
188
Id. at 188.
189 425 U.S. 185.
190

Id. at 198.

19 1

1d.

192

Id. at 199; see also CentralBank,511 U.S. at 173-74 (approving this analysis).
193 486 U.S. 622 (1988).
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protect investors and thereby serve the remedial purposes ofthe Act.194 The Court
acknowledged that policy concerns could be considered in construing the federal
securities laws, but indicated that any policy analysis may not be conducted
entirely apart from the statutory language.1 9 5 The ultimate issue is one of
congressional intent, and that intent must be ascertained primarily through the
language of the statute.1 96 The question is what Congress said in the statute,
'"not ... whether this Court thinks it can improve upon the statutory scheme that
197
Congress enacted into law."'
The SEC's policy argument in favor of broadening the Investment Company
Act definition of "security" is hard to square with the identity of the definitions in
the different statutes and, as we have seen, it is inconsistent with the Act's
legislative history. The Supreme Court's treatment of policy arguments in
securities cases has been uneven, 198 but the SEC's attempt to expand the
definition of "security" using a policy justification is inconsistent with the more
recent cases cited above.
VI. CONCLUSION
It is clear from the legislative history that Congress in 1940 intended the term
"security" in the Investment Company Act to have exactly the same meaning that
it had in the other federal securities statutes. No court has held to the contrary.
Most courts simply assume that "security" means the same thing in all the federal
securities statutes.
The SEC's interpretation of the term "security" in the Investment Company
Act shows that it is willing to overlook inconvenient legislative history and case
law in order to further its policy goals. When the federal courts were defining
"security" expansively under the Securities Act and the Exchange Act, the SEC
and its staff were quite willing to piggyback on those interpretations for
Investment Company Act purposes. When the courts, particularly the United
States Supreme Court, began to narrow the definition under the Securities Act and
194

See id. at 652-53. According to the Court, Pinter based his argument solely on policy
grounds and made no attempt to justify his position as a matter of statutory construction.
See id.
at 652.
195 See id at 653.
196 See id
197 Id (quoting Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560,578 (1979)).

198 The result in MarineBank for example, ultimately rests on a policy conclusion: "It is
unnecessary to subject issuers of bank certificates of deposit to liability under the antifraud
provisions of the federal securities laws since the holders of bank certificates of deposit are
abundantly protected under the federal banking laws" Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551,
559 (1982). But the most prominent modem example of a policy-based securities opinion is
probably Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Store, 421 U.S. 723 (1975), holding that only
purchasers or sellers of securities may sue under Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act. The
majority opinion in that case contains several pages of policy discussion. See id at 737-48.
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the Exchange Act, the SEC abandoned its equivalence position, and, to preserve
its Investment Company Act jurisdiction, suddenly "discovered" that the
definition of security in the Investment Company Act was broader than the
definitions in the other federal securities statutes. To support this sudden
revelation, the SEC ignored the directly relevant legislative history and instead
focused on general language about the dangers of liquid, easily negotiable
investments: no matter what the language of the statute said, no matter how
identical that language to the language in the other securities statutes, a broad
interpretation of "security" was needed to prevent the evils the Investment
Company Act regulates. When even that rationale has proven inconvenient, the
SEC staff has rejected its own policy argument, extending the term "security" to
instruments that are neither liquid nor easily negotiable.
The sole judicial authority for the SEC's interpretation is the cryptic reference
to "context" in footnote 11 of the Marine Bank opinion. The only statutory
underpinnings for the SEC's interpretation are the equally cryptic "context"
language at the beginning of the Investment Company Act's definitions section
and, since 1982, the language implying that certificates of deposit are securities.
Perhaps the SEC is correct that "security" requires a broader definition under
the Investment Company Act than under the other federal securities statutes.
Certificates of deposit, commercial notes, and money market accounts may
present dangers in this context not present in other contexts. If that is the case, the
SEC should reach that result honestly by presenting its policy argument to
Congress, not by stretching the Investment Company Act administratively
beyond its intended scope.

